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CONSCIOUSNESS AND ACTION
CONTROL
It was Sigmund Freud who put the rel-
ative contributions from conscious and
unconscious processes to the control
of human action on the psychologi-
cal agenda. Freud (1949) suggested that
action control emerges from the inter-
play between unconscious, automatic, and
reward-oriented action tendencies gener-
ated by the Id and rational, socially medi-
ated considerations provided by the Ego.
While Id processes were assumed to be
inaccessible for consciousness in princi-
ple, some, but not all Ego operations
were claimed to be conscious. This basic
logic still provides the blueprint for our
current theorizing about action control.
Indeed, numerous “dual-route” models in
almost all psychological and cognitive-
neuroscientific research areas assume that
human action emerges from the interplay
between consciously inaccessible auto-
matic action tendencies and consciously
accessible top-down processes that enforce
intentional action goals and social accept-
ability [for an overview, see Evans and
Stanovich (2013)]. Interestingly, many
authors associate conscious accessibility
with cognitive control (Hommel, 2007).
For instance, in the action-control model
of Norman and Shallice (1986), automatic,
stimulus-driven actions are contrasted
with actions that are under “deliber-
ate conscious control,” as if unconscious
deliberate control would be inconceiv-
able. In the same spirit, Libet (1985) has
suggested that consciousness might have
a “veto” that prevents unwanted actions
from execution. In the following, I will
argue that there is no evidence that con-
sciousness plays a causal or decisive role
in action control, so that there is no rea-
son to believe that consciousness is nec-
essary or useful for the control of human
actions.
EXECUTIVE IGNORANCE
If agents would control their actions
through the having of conscious experi-
ences, they should be able to report how
and based on what information they are
exerting such control. However, agents
know surprisingly little about their actions
(Wegner, 2002). As James (1890, p. 499)
put it: “we are only conversant with the
outward results of our volition, and not
with the hidden inner machinery of nerves
and muscles which are what it primarily
sets it at work”—a kind of executive igno-
rance (Turvey, 1977). Numerous examples
show that actions can be parameterized
and redirected by stimuli that the agent
is unable to consciously perceive because
of subliminal presentation or lesions in
higher perceptual areas [e.g., Prablanc and
Pélisson, 1990; for overviews, see Glover
(2004); Milner and Goodale, 1995]. Agents
can be easily fooled into experiencing
artificial effectors as being a part of their
own body (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998)
and perceiving actions of other people
as being carried out by themselves, or
vice versa (e.g., Nielsen, 1963). But even
higher-level executive-control operations
can be triggered by stimuli the conscious
perception of which is prevented by mask-
ing procedures [for overviews, see van
Gaal et al. (2012); Kunde et al., 2012].
Among other things, this holds for the
implementation of a task set (Reuss et al.,
2011) and the stopping of the planned
action (van Gaal et al., 2010), suggesting
that executive control does not rely on
consciousness. Indeed, there is widespread
agreement that generating a conscious
experience takes time, at least 300-500mil-
liseconds (e.g., Libet, 2004; Dehaene et al.,
2006), which would be way too slow for
many everyday actions and most reactions
in cognitive-psychological tasks. Hence,
not only is our conscious knowledge about
action control severely limited, it is also
difficult to see at which point in time the
application of this knowledge would be
useful.
One way to save a role for conscious-
ness and action control would be to relate
it to the translation of intentions into
more specific action plans. Consider, for
instance, the seminal study of Libet et al.
(1982), who observed that the physio-
logical indicators of action preparation
preceded the agent’s conscious urge to
act by hundreds of milliseconds. Even
though this might be taken against a
causal role of conscious experience in
the online-generation of actions (Wegner,
2002), it does not rule out such a role
in translating instructions into a gen-
eral action plan at the beginning of the
study. Indeed, several authors since Exner
(1879) have considered that implement-
ing such a plan delegates control to inter-
nal and external stimuli, which might
very well operate outside of conscious-
ness (Bargh, 1989; Hommel, 2000). And
yet, this would leave a severely limited
role of consciousness that is restricted to
off-line control. Moreover, it has been
claimed that integrating information from
and across different informational maps
and systems require conscious experi-
ence (Baars, 1988) and one might argue
that preparatory off-line action planning
involves such kind of cross-domain inte-
gration. However, recent demonstrations
that neither the integration of multimodal
event features (Zmigrod and Hommel,
2011) nor the integration of objects with
their background (Mudrik et al., 2011)
depend on consciousness do not support
this possibility.
LACK OF SPECIFICITY
While many action-control operations
were shown to be independent of con-
scious experience, some have been claimed
to require consciousness. After reviewing
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the available evidence van Gaal et al.
(2012) conclude that the conscious repre-
sentation of task-related stimuli increases
the duration (in the range of millisec-
onds or seconds), flexibility, and strate-
gic use of the represented information for
action control and other cognitive oper-
ations. In another recent review, Kunde
et al. (2012) conclude that all sorts of
cognitive-control operations can be auto-
matically driven by endogenous informa-
tion as long as it is provided by individual,
clearly discriminable events and associated
with the operation in a one-to-one man-
ner. Conscious representation, in turn,
is required if the cues are implicit, dis-
tributed in space and time (like frequency
information), and context-dependent. Key
findings emphasized in both reviews is
the absence of conflict-induced cognitive
adaptations, like post-error slowing and
increased attention to relevant informa-
tion after conflict trials or frequent con-
flicts, if the conflict is not consciously
perceived.
It is interesting to note that these
examples are not only surprisingly few
(if one would suspect consciousness to
control action as a rule) but they are
also rather nonspecific and nonrepresen-
tative for voluntary-action control. They
are not representative because sessions
with tens to hundreds of trials with many
repetitions of just a few stimuli and
responses are necessary to create these
(often rather small) trial-to-trial effects,
conditions that under real-life conditions
would motivate the employment of auto-
matic routines rather than online action
planning (Norman and Shallice, 1986).
And they are nonspecific as any kind of
consciously represented information—not
just action-related one—is more likely to
be held active and made available for
a longer time. Most importantly, none
of the consciousness-related abilities con-
sidered so far (information maintenance,
availability, and conflict-induced adapta-
tions) seems so crucial that its loss would
seriously compromise voluntary action
control.
NO CAUSALITY
Cognitive operations or processing results
may correlate with the presence or absence
of conscious representation for many rea-
sons. The probably most obvious one has
to do with the fact that human brains are
noisy, so that the quality of representing
a particular piece of information can vary
over time and trials. Signal-detection the-
ory states that reporting a particular state
of affairs requires that evidence passes a
particular threshold and that it can be
distinguished from noise, which implies
that low-energy, complex, and/or difficult-
to-discriminate information is unlikely to
be reportable. But it also implies that
this information is unlikely to be usable
for other purposes than conscious report,
irrespective of any causal dependency of
that other purpose on conscious expe-
rience. Accordingly, the mere correlation
between the accuracy of conscious report
and the usability of information for action
control does not tell us anything about the
causal relationship between consciousness
and action control.
What is needed to make a causal
case is the demonstration that preventing
conscious representation without reduc-
ing signal quality or affecting thresholds
impairs action control, or some other sort
of proof that signal quality and threshold-
setting cannot account for the correla-
tion. According to my knowledge, no
such proof has been provided so far.
Worse, there is not even evidence that
the few consciousness-correlated func-
tions are really under voluntary control.
Observations like post-error slowing or
increased attention to relevant informa-
tion after incongruent trials are often
called “strategic” because they seem to
optimize some aspect of behavior: slow-
ing down after having done something
wrong and paying attention after hav-
ing experienced decision conflict sounds
very reasonable and makes the impression
of being the outcome of a strategic (i.e.,
goal- and context-dependent) decision.
However, not only are the overall perfor-
mance benefits of such “strategies” often
negligible (speed is traded for accuracy
with post-error slowing and facilitation
benefits are traded for interference costs
through post-conflict potential effects),
but agents also seem to have little choice in
applying them. As shown by Jiménez and
Méndez (2013), the impact of previous
incongruency experiences is entirely inde-
pendent of (i.e., unaffected by) the actual
expectations of the agent, suggesting that
sequential effects are due to an automatic
learning process [for an application of this
logic to congruence-probability effects, see
Hommel (1994)]. The degree of associa-
tive learning and the reliability of the
emerging associations must depend on the
quality and discriminability of the sig-
nals being associated, which would explain
why sequential effects are less pronounced
and less reliable under conditions that are
likely to reduce signal-to-noise ratios and
discriminability—Kunde et al.’s (2012)
“implicit” stimulus conditions. Hence, the
available evidence can be parsimoniously
accounted for by well-understood low-
level associative processes. These processes
apparently run off automatically and, even
though they might often support action
control (which might well be the rea-
son why evolution has equipped us with
them), they can hardly count as “strategic”
except in a metaphorical sense (much like
Darwinian evolution would be considered
a survival “strategy”). Most importantly,
there is not any positive evidence that they
can be “consciously controlled” and the lit-
tle evidence we have actually suggests the
opposite.
WHAT ELSE IS CONSCIOUSNESS
GOOD FOR?
Taken altogether, there is not yet any
demonstration of a causal role of con-
sciousness in human action control, which
given the enormous interest in this issue
must be considered surprising. And it
raises the question what else conscious
experience might be good for. Even though
this brief opinion paper does not seem
appropriate to even try tackling that issue
exhaustively, a few speculations might be
in order. The most obvious difference
between conscious and unconscious rep-
resentations is that we are commonly able
to communicate about the former but
not the latter. Indeed, most researchers
accept communicability of the represented
information as either the consciousness-
defining characteristic or at least a useful
experimental operationalization. It is hard
to see what communicability might con-
tribute to the online control of actions
but it provides obvious benefits for social
purposes: we can inform other people
about our action plans, instruct others to
carry out particular actions, evaluate these
actions and provide feedback, and discuss
the pros and cons of alternative action
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plans. All of that effectively increases
social predictability and thus reduces
uncertainty—an aversive state that is driv-
ing much of our behavior (Berlyne, 1960).
Communicability might also help us to
describe and try understanding our own
behavior in ways that allows relating and
comparing it to others, thus providing the
opportunity for self-reflection and social
impression management. Most of these
hypothetical functions are post-actional,
so that they are not compromised by
the long time that conscious representa-
tion needs to build up or by the lack
of impact of most if not all conscious
representations on action control proper.
And they are not unlikely to work back
on action control in a broader, socially
embedded sense: how we interpret and
sell our actions to the public will affect
its reactions and feedback, which again
might often provide selective reward and
social constraints for our future actions.
Hence, the true impact of consciousness
on the control of our actions may be more
indirect and more socially mediated than
common sense has it.
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